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Abstract
This paper aims to observe the evolution of skilled labor demand and relative 
wages during the rapid industrialization period. Although this historic episode 
has attracted the researchers’ attention, the evolution of skill demand and its 
impact on inequality remained as a black box. To provide first-hand evidence, 
I construct a 3-digit industry-level dataset that covers 1955-1980 from the 
Mining and Manufacturing survey. Then I measure skill demand and relative 
wages following the skill-biased technological change literature.
Analysis results show that Korea experiences drastic skill upgrading during its 
rapid industrialization. The nonproduction workers’ share in wage bill increased 
throughout the 25 years of 1955-1980. Relative demand rose much faster in 
industries that were initially less skill-intensive but accumulated capital 
through investment faster. This implies that there was a strong skill-capital 
complementarity. 
Increasing skill demand and skill-capital complementarity are a force of 
increasing skill premium in wages and wage inequality. It was so until 1973. 
However, since then relative wages fell while skill demand kept rising. This 
is unique to the Korean experience, It also implies that the supply of skilled 
labor expanded even faster than the skill demand. Although it is possible to 
connect this to the heavy-chemical industrialization, falling skill premium and 
inequality was most driven by the “within” or common effect. Furthermore, 
emerging heavy-chemical industries had greater skill demand, therefore a 
positive effect on relative wage.
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Introduction
There is a strong relationship between economic development and human capital. 
Better education and training increases labor quality and productivity. On the other hand, 
economic development also increases the demand for skilled workers. Development 
involves structural changes that reallocate labor from less productive sectors to high 
productive sectors. Growing demand for skilled workers increases the wage premium for 
high-skill workers. The wage premium serves as a signal for human capital accumulation. 
If an appropriate supply of skilled labor is made in response to the labor market signal, 
it will enable sustainable economic growth and development.
The wage premium is also an indicator of labor market inequality. Because there are 
more unskilled workers than skilled workers, increasing wage premium indicates growing 
wage inequality. In many developing countries, it is generally observed that both skill 
demand and wage premium increase together. As the supply of education and skills does 
not keep up with the growing demand, many workers remain in less productive 
occupations and firms have difficulty in recruiting well-educated workers. 
How does the Korean case fit this frame? South Korea’s rapid industrialization is a 
well-known and rare historical episode. Although there are several latecomer countries 
that have grown fast, it is hard to find a case of dramatic change in industrial structure 
like Korea. Such a rapid transformation would have favored more educated and more 
skilled workers. However, as many economists and policymakers have noted as a key 
driver of the nation’s economic success, Koreans were keen on education. If there was a 
supply of education enough to meet the growing demand in industry, there would have 
been a downward pressure on the wage premium and wage inequality. 
There exists some evidence to support this hypothesis. Mostly examining 
individual-level data, they commonly find that overall wage inequality and the wage 
premium decreases in the 1970s. For example, Park (2018) examines the Occupation and 
Wage Survey (OWS hereafter), an individual-level sample data collected by the Ministry 
of Labor. Specifically, he decomposes overall inequality measures into between- and 
within-group differences. [Figure 1-1] plots the decomposition results according to 
educational attainment. It shows that , the early 1970s was a period of rising inequality 
between education groups as "between-(education) group" increases. This would reflect the 
growing demand for more educated worker in the manufacturing sector. In the late 
1970s, between inequality declines. Although it is difficult to pin down the exact reason, 
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this is likely to reflect the growing supply of education.
Source: Park (2018)
Figure 1-1. Evolution of Wage Inequality in Korea 
Kim and Topel (1995) calculate the wage premium from the OWS, defined as the 
log wage differential between college, high school, and elementary school graduates, and 
observe the changes in the wage premiums, as illustrated in [Figure 1-2]. They find that 
wage premiums decreased since 1976 and that the declining trend is not explained by the 
changes in educational composition. Based on these findings, they suggest that the main 
driver of the wage compression that continued until 1990 was the price, rather than 
quantity, of skilled labor. They suspect that "extraordinary increase" in school enrollments 
would have dominated the increasing demand for skilled labor.
Source: Kim and Topel (1995) 
Figure 1-2| Evolution of Wage Premium (log relative wage)
Cha, Hwang, and Lee (2014) extends the time period to cover almost a century 
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instead of narrowing the scope to the financial sector. As illustrated in [Figure 1-3], they 
track the relative wage of workers with tertiary and elementary education to those with 
secondary education. While confirming the results above, the figure showsthe rapid rise 
and fall in wage premium of the 1970s was a special case in the modern Korean 
history.1)
Figure 1-3| Evolution of Wage Premium, Financial Sector
Source: Cha et al. (2014)
While these studies provide useful first-hand evidence about wage inequality in the 
1970s, much is yet to be known. First, they do not address the evolution in the labor 
demand side. They all examine individual-level data, track changes in relative wages, and 
draw inferences about the underlying changes in skill demand. Relying on individual-level 
data and not exploiting various industry-side characteristics, such as productivity and 
export, their investigation does not connect industrialization and labor market changes 
directly. Moreover, they do not observe what happened in the 1960s. Scholars view that 
Korea’s industrialization began in the early 1960s under the military administration of 
Park Chung Hee. With the OWS that covers only years since 1971, it is difficult to 
explore the effects of the early industrialization on skill demand and wage premium. 
Using industry data provides a good alternative in all aspects. Statistics Korea and its 
predecessors have publish the Mining and Manufacturing Survey (MMS hereafter) series 
since 1958. They contain information about production and employment in very detail. 
Until the mid-2000s, the MMS series has recorded the number of workers and total 
wage compensation by worker class, production workers and nonproduction workers.Given 
1) They define the wage premium in a different way from Kim and Topel (1995). While Kim and Topel use 
lnwH-lnwL=ln(wH/wL), they use(wH/wL)-1.
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this data availability, one can capitalize on the skill approach developed by labor 
economists that uses worker type as a proxy for skill. If the individual-side outcomes 
mirror industry-side changes, the inequality between the nonproductionworker and 
production worker should exhibit a similar trend.
This study constructs an industry-level dataset and observe the evolution of relative 
demand and skills. Using the employer-side MMS data, I illustrate the long-term trend in 
relative demand and wage. Taking advantage of different pace of upskilling across 
industries, I examine the patterns drivers of upskilling. Then I 
This paper contributes to the literature 
First, I observe the upskilling trend directly from the MMS. In particular, I extend 
the time coverage to the 1960s. 
most dynamic time of the Korean economic history and offers a more broad and 
deeper understanding about the relationship between industrialization and skill upgrading.
The existing evidence indicates that wage inequality converged only after the 
mid-1970s. 
This advantage leads to another advantage that one can link the change in industrial 
structure to skill demand. The literature has documented the two phases of the Korean 
industrialization of the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1960s, light manufacturing industries 
grew faster as the government pushed the export-oriented policy. By contrast, 
heavy-chemical industries (HCIs) became the leading sector in the 1970s since the 
kickoff of the HCI policy drive. This sharp contrast would have affected labor demand. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explains how I 
construct the data. In Chapter 3, I review the analytic framework and existing evidence 
on this topic, which motivates my study. Chapter 4 presents evidence about the evolution 
of skill demand and relative wage. Chapter 5 concludes. 
Analytic Framework
Measuring Upskilling
In the methodological sense, this paper builds on the labor economics literature 
ofskill-biased technological change. Bound, and Griliches (1994)is a representative study 
on this subject. They observe the upward trend in the share of nonproduction workers 
since 1960, which they believe that this reflects increasing demand for skilled labor. 
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Motivated by the observation, they examine whether the "skill upgrading" or 
"upskilling"was driven by a universal force or structural change within manufacturing. 
Finding that the upskilling was a common change, they conduct additional analysis to 
find the main drivers. They test a version of the skill-biased technological change 
(SBTC) hypothesis, by examining whether more computer use increased the demand for 
nonproduction workers. 
This paper borrows much of the methodology from Bound et al. (1994). First, to 
measureskill demand, not only the nonproduction share of employment but also the share 
of the wage bill is used. They propose the wage bill share because of potential bias. 
More demand for skilled labor increases would increase their relative wage. But as 
skilled labor becomes more expensive, this could the demand for them. With this bias, 
using skilled workers’ share in employment would lead to an underestimation of their 
importance. 
The decomposition of upskilling into the common and reallocation effects employs 
the share-shift analysis. First, the share of nonproduction workers in the total wage bill 
( ) is defined as the sum of nonproduction share of each sector ( ) times the sector’s 
share in total employment ( ).
 ∑θ
Then the change in  is driven by the common change and the change in shares 
(reallocation):
Δ ∑θ̅Δ ∑̅Δθ
The former measures common changes and the latter measures reallocation effects 
between industries. They find that the "between" component explains only a small part of 
the skill upgrading trend. In other words, upskilling was not concentrated in growing 
industries but common to all industries.2)
There are a few studies that apply this approach to the Korean data. Ahn and Hur 
(2015) analyze the MMS at the 3- and 5-digit SIC level to find that skill demand was 
in an upward trend since 1992 and that it was driven by the "within" effect. Then they 
2) While they consider different industry groups (domestic consumption, exports, imports, and defense), it does not 
affect the main results.
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compare the changes in relative demand and relative wages to make an inference about 
how supply and demand moved in each period. For example, because relative demand 
was on the rise but relative wage was on the fall until 1997, they guess that the change 
in relative supply was faster. After 1997, relative wage also rose, which indicates that 
the demand for skilled workers increased faster than supply.This paper conducts the same 
analysis for the 1960s and 1970s.
Finding that the "within" factor dominates the "between"factor, the next task is to 
investigate the common drivers of upskilling. Economists have focused on the role of 
technology. But testing the SBTC hypothesis requires a well-specified regression equation. 
Berman et al. (1994) derive one with assumptions of the translog cost function, cost 
minimization, and constant returns to scale: 





 is the relative wage, measured by the ratio of the salaries of nonproduction 
workers to the wages of production workers in sector j. However, in practice this ,term 
is dropped because of the endogeneity concern that cross-sectional differences in relative 
wage reflect differences in skill demand. Berman et al. (1994) justifies this by assuming 
that "the price of quality-adjusted  labor does not vary across industries."By eliminating 
relative wages from the equation, focus is given to , which captures capital-skill 
complementarity. Most of the subsequent empirical analyses that adopt this specification 
follow the suit. 
In their masterpiece, The Race between Education and Technology, Goldin and Katz 
(2008) also adopts the SBTC framework to analyze how technological innovation in the 
early twentieth century changed labor demand. They focus on new methods of 
production, such as batch and continuous processes, and the role of electricity. While 
there was strong capital-skill complementarity from the beginning of the century, the 
electrification of factories made the relationship even stronger. Factories that shifted from 
generated electricity to purchased electricity underwent fundamental changes in factory 
layout and the type of machinery. These changes required workers better literacy and 
cognitive skills. 
To validate the story econometrically, they employ the same regression specification 
that drops relative wage, for the same concern of endogeneity, and keeps the 
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capitalintensity and the fraction of purchased electricity in total horsepower of the 
beginning period. Because the dependent variables are the share of nonproduction workers 
in the wagebill, significant and positive coefficients support for capital- and 
technology-skill complementarity, which is consistent with their results.
For developing countries, trade rather than technology is considered to be the source 
of labor demand change. For example, Bustos (2011)find that the demand for skilled 
labor increased in Argentina after trade liberalization. This skill upgrading was driven by 
not reallocation but within-firm changes. As for the mechanism, she finds that exporters 
increased skill demand faster, and this skill upgrading is also associated with technology 
upgrading. In contrast, Pavcnik (2003) examines the role of imported materials and 
technology in Columbiabut only finds that they are no longer important once plant fixed 
effects are controlled. This ambiguity calls for more evidence on the trade-skill 
relationship.
Guessing the Drivers of Upskilling
While there is a little role in the SBTC analysis for the concern of endogeneity, the 
relative wage has its own significance as it mediates the demand and supply side. It 
sends a market signal to potential workers for education and training. When skill 
premium in wages is high, more people would choose to take required education and 
training. If the supply for education and training is elastic enough, the skillpremium 
would decrease gradually. What researchers observe is skill premium in equilibrium. To 
understand the evolution of the labor market comprehensively, one needs to take both 
wage and employment into account. 
Goldin and Katz (2008) does this sort of supply-demand analysis for the entire 
twentieth century. The idea is simple; if both relative wage and skill demand increase, 
that would suggest that demand rise faster than supply. If skill demand increases and 
relative wage decreases, it would indicate that supply rise faster. [Figure 2-1] from 
Feenstra and Taylor’s textbook (2017) demonstrates the framework.
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Source: Feenstra and Taylor (2017)  
Figure 2-1. Evolution of Relative Demand and Wage in the US
Because Goldin and Katz assume that skill supply is assumed to be fixed over the 
short run, they focus on deriving a labor demand equation. Like in the SBTC analysis, 




Where  is output,  is total factor productivity, and  and  are skilled and 
unskilled labor supply, respectively.Here the elasticity of substitution between skilled and 
unskilled labor is .  measures the share of skilled workers in total labor input.







By estimating this equation for each period and connecting the estimated elasticity, 
one can track the evolution of labor demand over time. 
Observing the long-run time series of college wage premium, Goldin and Katz find 
that wage premium was in a declining trend in the first half of the century, but in a 
risingtrend in the second half. Computing the elasticities of the equation above, they 
conclude that skill supply, rather than demand, determined the trend in wage premium. In 
other words, skill wage premium declined when supply outpaced demand, and it 
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increased when demand grew faster. For this reason, they emphasize the role of 
education in the economic success of the United States in the twentieth century.
Wage premium draws economists attention for another reason; because it is a good 
measure of inequality. Rising skill wage premium indicates rising overall inequality 
because unskilled workers outnumber skilled workers. Various factors affect the skillwage 
premium. While Goldin and Katz emphasize the role of education in inequality of 
twentieth-century America, many economists focus on trade and globalization for 
developing countries. As summarized in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), a commonly found 
pattern from various empirical studies is that trade liberalization tends to increase skill 
premium and inequality. 
Data
The purpose of this study is to document the patterns of structural change 
inmanufacturing. This investigation requires industry data at a finer level. I compile a 
dataset from various publications by statistics authorities. The annual Mining and 
Manufacturing Survey (MMS) constitutes the main source of the data. Conducted by the 
Bureau of Statistics, it aims at measuring economic activities between census years, years 
ending in five and eight. Before 1963, the MMS was conducted by the Bank of Korea 
and the Korean Reconstruction Bank.
The MMS collected various information about the input and output of manufacturing 
establishments. My dataset is based on the aggregated statistics by the industry in the 
published reports. The reports include the number of establishments, different types of 
production costs (materials, fuels, electricity, water, and contract work), the value of 
shipments and production, year-end value and changes in inventory, and changes in the 
value of fixed assets (investment and disposals). However, the most important information 
would be the number of nonproduction and production workers, and the compensation 
paid to each group of workers. Because the MMS contains totals only, proper 
transformation into per-worker indicators is necessary. Some variables have limited 
availability. For example, capital stock was collected only in the census years, therefore 
the year-end capital stock is available only for 1968, 1973, and 1978.
The biggest hurdle in the digitization process is frequent changes of the industry 
classification system. Reflecting dramatic changes in industrial structure, it was modified 
in 1963, 1964, 1965, 1968, 1970, and 1975. I performed many crosswalks, setting the 
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second Korean Standard Industry Classification System (KSIC) in 1963 as the reference. 
The 1963 MMS was part of the Korean economic census and 1963 world 
programme of basic industrial inquiriesof the UN. Aided by international experts, the 
MMS introduced a classification system that meets up the international standards.
Determining the unit of analysis is another challenge. Although working at the four- 
or five-digit KSIC level is possible, early reports do not distinguish very 
narrowly-defined industries. For example, a 4-digit industry in the 1958 report is 
equivalent to a 3-digit industry in reports of the 1970s. Therefore, I determined to 
construct the dataset at the 3-digit KSIC level to secure consistency in industry 
classification and variety at the same time. As a result, I have 29 industries and 17 time 
period: 1955, 1958, 1963, and every year since 1967.
Evolution of Skill Demand and Relative Wages
Overall Trend in Skill Demand
With the constructed data, I first illustrate the evolution of skill demand in the 
overall Korean manufacturing. [Figure 4-1] presents the overall trend in skill demand. 
The blue solid line is the share of nonproduction workers in total employment and the 
red dashed line is the share of nonproduction workers in the wage bill. It can be seen 
that wage bill share is consistently higher than employment share, though the two series 
move together over time. As Berman et al. (1994) claimed, this indicates that 
employment share understates the degree of skill upgrading. 
[Figure 4-1] shows that the rapid industrialization of Korea was also a process of 
skill upgrading. It may not be very surprising given that this positive relationship 
between development and skill upgrading is commonly found among developing countries. 
But Two waves are identified from the Figure. The share of nonproduction workers 
started rising around 1958, just before the nation started industrialization. The upskilling 
process comes to a halt around 1970. But the share of nonproduction workers rise again 
since 1974 and the rising trend accelerated even further. It may not be a coincidence 
that there was a turning point in industrial policy in the middle of the 1970s toward the 
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Employment Share Wage Bill Share
Figure 4-1. Evolution of Skill Demand
   
Sectoral Differences in Upskilling
As noted above, the timing of upskilling seems to have something to do with 
industrial policies. Therefore,it would be interesting to explore which industries led skill 
upgrading. If some industries were particularly faster, then it would also be captured in a 
decomposition analysis. 
First, I examine the relationship between the skill demand at year t-1 and change 
between t-1 and t to see if the skill demand of industries were persistent throughout the 
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Figure 4-2. Initial Skill Demand and Change in Skill Demand 
The left panel plots all observations, and the right panel plots observations of 1958, 
1970, and 1980. I do this because one or two years may not be long enough for 
adjustment. Then the cross-sectional relationship may mask the true relationship. The 
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Figure suggests that skill upgrading was faster in industries with low initial skill demand. 
Changing the time interval to about 10 years only strengthens the negative relationship. 
Therefore, it is not the case that some industries have inherently high skill demand and 
only changing shares would determine the speed of upskilling.
I also look at the relationship between productivity and skill upgrading. The 
underlying hypothesis is that high-productivity sectors required more skilled labor. [Figure 
4-3] presents the relationship between initial labor productivity, defined as log value 
added per production worker, and the following skill upgrading. For effective comparisons 
across time, I demeaned each industry’s labor productivity from the average labor 
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Figure 4-3. Initial Productivity and Change in Skill Demand 
In the left panel, no particular relationship is found, which suggest that skill 
upgrading was not specific to high-productivity industries. The right panel looks at the 
relationship by each decade, before 1970 and 1970 and after. The blue hollow circle 
symbol indicates observations for the pre-1970 period and the red x symbol observations 
for 1970 and after. The right panel shows that the productivity-upskilling relationship has 
changed in the 1970s. In the 1950s and 1960s, skill demand rose faster in 
high-productivity industries. However, in the 1970s, low-productivity industries increased 
their skill demand. 
Finally, I look at the relationship between capital intensity and skill upgrading. I 
expect to get a hint about the skill-capital complementarity from this observation. I 
measure capital intensity as the fraction of total fixed assets to the value of the 
shipment, as Berman et al. (1994) did. Then I observe how the change in the 
nonproduction share in wage bill is associated with the initial capital intensity and the 
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change in capital intensity. As explained in the data section, the year-end amount of 
fixed assets were measured only in 1968, 1973, and 1978.
The left panel of [Figure 4-4] shows that skill demand increased faster in industries 
with initially low capital intensity. But the right panel looks at the relationship between 
"changes" and suggest a different skill-capital relationship. It appears that the relative 
demand for nonproduction workers increased more in industries with faster capital 
accumulation. Berman et al. (1994) and other empirical studies also focus on the 
coefficient for capital intensity. The right panel indicates that there was strong 
skill-capital complementarity in skill upgrading during the rapid industrialization period as 
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Figure 4-4. Capital Intensity and Change in Skill Demand, 1973-78
[Figure 4-4] reports the capital-skill relationship without considering other industry 
characteristics. To obtain more reliable results, I also run regressions with the 
specification below, with industry and fixed effects. To reflect different sizes of 
industries, I weight the regression with total employment. 
   ln 

  
While it slightly varies depending on the specification and measure choice, the 
regression results yield ≈0.114 consistently. When an industry increases in capital 
intensity is 1% above the average, relative demand grows 0.114% more than the average. 
Berman et al. (1994) obtains ≈0.014~0.038 using the same specification. Capital-skill 
complementarity was much stronger in the Korean case.
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Evolution of Relative Wages
So far, relative wages –skill premium in wages has been something to be controlled 
for. However, the quantity of labor interacts with is the price. By considering both 
relative wages and demand at the same time, one can understand how the labor market 
reacts to the fundamental - technological and institutional - changes. 
[Figure 4-5] illustrates the trend in skill demand and relative wage. The figure shows 
two distinct waves in the demand-wage relationship. In the 1960s, relative wage and 
demand tended to move together. This implies that the skill upgrading in the 1960s was 
driven by an expansion of demand for skill. By contrast, in the 1970s relative wage 
declines when skill demand keeps rising. With the supply-demand analytic framework 
explained in Section 2, one can infer that the supply of skilled labor expanded even 
faster than its demand. 
Expanding relative demand and falling relative wages is unique to the Korean 
experience. Southeast Asian countries and China experienced rising skill demand and its 
relative wage during their economic development. Wage inequality widens in the process. 
Korea was different. As seen in [Figure 2-4], there was a big wave of wage inequality 
reduction that lasted for twenty years. [Figure 4-5] shows that declining skill premium in 
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Figure 4-5. Trend in Skill Demand and Relative Wage
This trend continues to the 1980s. [Figure 4-6] is from Berman, Bound, and Machin 
(1998). It shows that Korea was almost the only country that experienced a falling 
relative wage of nonproduction workers to production workers in the 1980swhen both 
advanced and developing countries underwent skill-biased technological change. As 
18
Berman et al. (1998) and Helpman (2017) mentions "the exception of Korea" in their 
discussion, the Korean case is very unique. It seems certain that the supply of skilled 
labor increased very fast. It is necessary to find the factors of such a drastic increase. 
One can suspect that rapid expansion of the secondary and tertiary education would have 
played a role, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I focus on the 
associations of industrial change and the labor market outcomes.
Source: Berman et al. (1998)
Figure 4-6. Relative Wages and GNP per capita in the 1980s
It is well known that Korea’s Industrial policy shifted from the export-led 
industrialization in the 1960s to the heavy-chemical industrialization (HCI) in the 1970s. 
There was little industry targeting in the 1960s. Exporting industries were where Korea 
had a comparativeadvantage. But as the HCI drive kicked off around 1973 for military 
purposes, the government used various policy tools, such as tariffs and subsidies, 
targeting at key industries that have a close relationship with military production. This 
means that the government was willing to select strategic sectors at the expense of 
short-term productivity and efficiency. Contrasting patterns in skill premium around 1973 
may reflect this policy shift and changing composition. 
[Figure 4-7] illustrates the changes in relative demand and wages of "exporting 
industries" and "import-competing industries" in the 1970s. I followed Cheon (1999)to 
define industry groups.3) Generally speaking, the "exporting" group represent the main 
industries in the 1960s with high productivity, whereas the "import-competing"group 
represent the HCI-related industries. [Figure 4-7] clearly shows that skill upgrading was 
3) KSIC codes of Exporting industries: 321, 322, 323, 324, 390, 355, 381, 383, 384 
Import-competing industries: 351, 372, 382, 385
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faster in exporting industries that had low initial nonproduction share and accumulated 
capital at a faster pace. Skill demand also increased in exporting industries, but the 
increase was much smaller than that of import-competing industries. As the supply of 
skilled labor expanded in the 1970s, relative wage fell in both groups. But the decline 
was greater in the exporting industries, probably due to weaker skill demand than 
import-competing industries.
This observation highlights the importance of common changes. Skill demand 
increased in all industries, it had a positive effect on relative wages. Likewise, because 
the rapid expansion of supply also affected all industries, skill premium fell in both 
groups, despite significant differences in skill demand and relative wages. So the common 
factors dominate the "between"factors. But even if there was a role of changing the 
industrial structure, it can be said that it did not contribute to reducing wage premium 
and inequality, because the HCIs had greater skill demand thus paid a higher wage 
premium.
Figure 4-7. Change in Relative Demand and Relative Wage in the 1970s,
by Trade Classification 
Conclusion
This paper constructed a 3-digit industry-level dataset that covers 1955-1980 to 
observe the evolution of skilled labor demand, measured by the share of nonproduction 
workers in the wage bill, and their relative wages.
Analysis results suggest that Korea experiences drastic skill upgrading during its rapid 
industrialization. The nonproduction workers’ share in wage bill increased throughout the 
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25 years of 1955-1980. Relative demand rose much faster in industries that were initially 
less skill-intensive but accumulated capital through investment faster. This implies that 
there was a strong skill-capital complementarity. 
Increasing skill demand and skill-capital complementarity are a force of increasing 
skill premium in wages and wage inequality. It was so until 1973. However, since then 
relative wages fell while skill demand kept rising. This is unique to the Korean 
experience, It also implies that the supply of skilled labor expanded even faster than the 
skill demand. Although it is possible to connect this to the heavy-chemical 
industrialization, falling skill premium and inequality was most driven by the "within"or 
common effect. Furthermore, emerging heavy-chemical industries had greater skill demand, 
therefore a positive effect on relative wage.
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